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Abstract 
Research on people’s motives for engaging in high-risk activities has typically been viewed 
through the single-focused lens of sensation seeking. We provide evidence that 
comprehensively challenges that view. First, we develop and confirm the structure of a three-
factor measure of motives: the Sensation seeking, Emotion regulation and Agency Scale 
(SEAS; Study 1). We then use the SEAS to provide evidence of differential motives for two 
high-risk activities: skydiving and mountaineering. The motive for skydiving is strongly 
associated with sensation seeking; the motive for mountaineering is strongly associated with 
emotion regulation and agency, but not with sensation seeking (Study 2). We also show that 
these conclusions cannot be drawn from existing measures of personality and sensation 
seeking (Study 3). Finally, individuals who are motivated by emotion regulation and agency 
needs also have greater expectations regarding their emotion regulation and agency. It is 
these greater expectations that most successfully discriminate mountaineers from skydivers 
and control participants (Study 4). It is concluded that researchers should no longer consider 
risk-takers as a homogenous sensation seeking group and should consider risk-taking as a 
potential model of human endeavor. The SEAS can be used as a measure of motives for 
behavior whenever sensation seeking, agency, or emotion regulation is thought to be at the 
core of such motives, and the results are discussed in the context of encouraging personality 
researchers to consider the specific spontaneous behaviors that motivate different people.  
Keywords: agency, emotion regulation, sensation seeking, risk-taking sport, 
mountaineering, skydiving 
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Great Expectations: Different High-Risk Activities Satisfy Different Motives 
Many years ago the great British explorer George Mallory, who was to die on 
Mount Everest, was asked [by a New York Times journalist] why did he want to climb 
it. He said, ‘Because it is there.’ Well, space is there, and we’re going to climb it, and 
the moon and the planets are there, and new hopes for knowledge and peace are there  
– J.F. Kennedy’s moon speech (1962) 
Humans have evolved through taking risks. In fact, most human actions can be 
conceptualized as containing an element of risk: as we take our first step, we risk falling 
down; as we try a new food, we risk being disgusted; as we ride a bicycle, we risk falling 
over; as we go on a date, we risk being rejected; and as we travel to the moon, we risk not 
coming back. Humans and risk are intertwined and it is thus perhaps unsurprising that, 
despite the risk-averse society that appears to have recently evolved, many people crave 
danger, excitement and risk. This is exemplified in the current boom of high-risk activities 
such as skydiving and bungee jumping. The long-standing view is that participants of high-
risk activities form a single homogenous group: sensation seekers (Zuckerman, 1979, 2007). 
And yet there are some risk-takers that appear to be motivated by something more. For 
example, in the early 1920’s George Mallory’s dogged pursuit of the summit of Mount 
Everest, which led to his death in 19241, can hardly be considered “sensation seeking.” 
Although Mallory’s purported retort of “because it’s there” is a lesson in prosaicness, it does 
little to shed light on understanding why people might voluntarily risk their own and others’ 
life to achieve what appears to be a trivial and dangerous pursuit: to attempt to get to the top 
of a mountain only to come straight back down; or go to the moon only to come back. 
Certainly, despite the long-standing view that all high-risk activities are motivated by 
                                                 
1 Mount Everest was eventually climbed successfully for the first time in 1953.  
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sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1979, 2007), Mallory’s and others’ endeavors seem motivated 
by something very different and there appears to be an important lesson to learn from those 
who voluntarily choose to take risks for the achievement of a grand objective. In this paper, 
we explore the motives for such purposeful high-risk endeavors and use mountaineering as a 
model of such behavior. We aim to demonstrate that high-risk activities are not simply 
derived by sensation seeking but rather by something rather more intrapsychic, which we aim 
to unearth here. Although we use mountaineering as the investigative framework for this 
research the application is clearly considerably broader – as illustrated by Kennedy above – 
and might be applied as a model of human endeavor.    
Sensation seeking  
Zuckerman (1994) suggested that sensation seekers display a willingness to take risks 
in order to experience the sensation rewards of “sensation-seeking activities” (p. 37) such as 
drug use, dangerous driving, and risky sports. For example, skydivers – especially novice and 
intermediate skydivers – frequently proclaim themselves “adrenaline junkies” (Celsi, Rose, & 
Leigh, 1993, p. 16).  
Conversely, mountaineering and other high-risk endeavors (e.g., polar expeditions) 
are largely devoid of sensation provision. Despite these clear differences, psychologists have 
typically satisfied themselves with explanations revolving around this sensation seeking 
model for all high-risk sports (e.g., Zuckerman, 1979, 1994, 2007). Acceptance of such a 
view has hampered research into the potential lessons that one might learn from individuals 
who voluntarily pursue great achievements in the face of danger. For example, polar 
expeditions (Leon, McNally, & Ben-Porath, 1989), ocean sailing (Norris & Weinman, 1996), 
ocean rowing (Woodman, Hardy, Barlow, & Le Scanff, 2010), and mountaineering (Lester, 
1983, 2004) seem to reflect an experience that is antonymous to sensation seeking. 
Individuals engaged in these activities undergo hardship, suffering, and monotony on a daily 
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basis (Loewenstein, 2007). Mountaineering, for example, not only requires extensive 
planning and preparation but the expedition itself – typically over many weeks – is often 
reported as toilsome and tedious (e.g., Ewert, 1994), and any pleasure is largely derived 
retrospectively. Most worthwhile human endeavors share many of the characteristics of 
mountaineering. That is, the vast majority of time on worthwhile projects is spent dealing 
with hardship, monotony, and setbacks. Furthermore, “thrills” are actively avoided in such 
endeavors. In mountaineering, thrills are typically associated with a loss of control (e.g., an 
avalanche, a fall) and an increased risk of serious injury or death (Kirkpatrick, 2011). 
Sensation seeking is clearly a fruitless theoretical standpoint from which to 
understand the motives for such experiences. One alternative theoretical framework that 
appears particularly promising for examining motives for engagement in high-risk activities 
centers on the constructs of emotion regulation and agency.  
Emotion Regulation and Agency 
Emotion regulation is the term used to characterize the diverse processes involved in 
initiating, maintaining, and modulating the intensity, type, or duration of emotions (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Thompson, 1994). It refers to actions that influence “which emotions we 
have, when we have them, and how we experience and express them” (Gross, 2002, p. 282). 
To be an agent is to influence intentionally one’s functioning and life circumstances 
(Bandura, 2001, 2006). An agentic self presumes active and causal contributions to behavior 
and development (Bandura, 2001); the self is the author of internal states such as intent, 
belief, and desire (Little, Snyder, & Wehmeyer, 2006). The most central and pervasive 
mechanism of agency is individuals’ beliefs regarding their capabilities to exercise control 
over events that affect their lives (Bandura, 1997). 
Participants of prolonged engagement high-risk activities (e.g., mountaineers, polar 
explorers) display a difficulty with emotion regulation and a diminished sense of agency in 
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important aspects of everyday life (Hunt & Daines, 2004; Leon et al., 1989; Woodman et al., 
2010). Specifically, empirical and biographical evidence suggests that mountaineers display: 
below-average toleration of others’ emotional needs (Hunt & Daines, 2004); avoidance of 
emotional sharing (Roberts, 1986); a lack of interest in social interaction with a low 
perceived need for intimacy or affection (Lester, 1983); and a difficulty describing feelings 
(Woodman et al., 2010). These individuals also sense that the course of their life and the 
emotions engendered therein are dictated and driven by forces outside of their control (Lester, 
1983, 2004).  
Since a perceived difficulty to influence intentionally one’s environment, behavior, 
and self-regulation, is widely acknowledged as antithetical to psychological well-being 
(deCharms, 1968; Deci & Ryan, 2002), individuals will seek such influence via alternate 
means. Specifically, certain high-risk activities likely serve a compensatory function for the 
participant: an opportunity to experience emotion regulation and agency in a way that is 
perceived as being not readily available in everyday life. Indeed, it has been suggested – but 
not tested – that such individuals may intentionally seek out situations of chaos, stress and 
danger so as to demonstrate or reassert their agency and emotional control (Lupton & 
Tulloch, 2003; Lyng, 2005). Such dissatisfaction with the status quo is a sine qua non of all 
human endeavor and all progress. In other words, we need to feel sufficiently dissatisfied 
with the present state to be motivated to progress toward a future state (Carver & Scheier, 
1998).  
If an individual engages in a high-risk activity with the specific (implicit or explicit) 
aim of experiencing emotion regulation and agency then there is likely an additional benefit 
from participation. That is, participants may experience a perceived transfer of emotion 
regulation and agency from the high-risk domain back into important aspects of their 
everyday life (cf. Woodman et al., 2010). Although such transfer effects have been purported 
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to be the aim of engagement in high-risk sport for certain participants (Pain & Pain, 2005; cf. 
Smith, 2005), the extent to which any psychological benefits are perceived to transfer into 
important aspects of participants’ everyday life remains unexplored.  
When purposeful goal-directed efforts to demonstrate emotion regulation and agency 
in everyday life are unsuccessful an individual will typically experience negative affect 
(Wicklund, 1975). When faced with such situations, individuals can award an alternative 
compensatory goal a higher priority than was previously the case (Sloman, 1987). For this 
priority to be given, the alternate program of action should reflect the same abstract goal as 
the “failed” activity but with a greater likelihood of success (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Thus, 
the perceived difficulty in experiencing emotion regulation and agency that mountaineers 
report in important aspects of their everyday life (cf. Woodman et al., 2010) may translate 
into their compensatory seeking of the experience of emotion regulation and agency in the 
high-risk domain. However, there are seemingly many compensatory activities that could 
provide an individual with the experience of emotion regulation and agency. As such, it is 
important to consider the specificity of risk-takers’ difficulty with emotion regulation and 
diminished agency to understand their motives for seeking emotion regulation and agency 
specifically in their chosen high-risk domain.  
Mountaineers’ difficulty with emotion regulation in everyday life appears to be such 
that they experience a constant, generalized and internalized low-level anxiety (Massumi, 
1993); a response to a non-specific threat, the sources of which may be confusing and unclear 
(Cisler, Olatunji, Feldner, & Forsyth, 2010). As such, mountaineers are likely unable to 
identify the origin of their anxiety, express it, or control it effectively (Woodman et al., 
2010). The attraction of the high-risk domain is that it enables participants to move from a 
non-specific, ambiguous and internal anxiety to a specific, identifiable, and externally-
derived intense emotion: fear (cf. Castanier, Le Scanff & Woodman, 2010; Fenichel, 1939). 
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Unlike anxiety, fear is a response to a known, external, and definite threat (Sadock & Sadock, 
2007), of which there is an abundance in the high-risk domain. Fear can be an attractive 
alternative to anxiety since externalized relatively objective threats are more readily 
interpreted as within an individual’s control (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998) and require explicit 
rather than implicit emotion regulation (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). As such, successful 
emotion regulation can diminish fear (Cisler et al., 2010), which is supported by 
mountaineers’ ardent desire to experience a “freedom from fear” (Lester, 2004, p. 91). Recent 
research further supports the central role of fear in seeing life in a more positive light after the 
fearful event (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2012).  
Mountaineers’ perceived diminished agency appears specific to emotional 
interpersonal relationships (Lester, 1983; Woodman et al., 2010). As such, an appropriate 
compensatory activity is not one that provides merely a generic sense of agency.  Rather, it 
must serve the same abstract goal as the “failed” activity, but wherein success is more likely 
(Taylor & Hamilton, 1997). Specifically, mountaineering affords the individual an 
opportunity to disengage temporarily from close interpersonal relationships in everyday life 
and to engage in a compensatory relationship with the mountains. Interestingly, the 
mountaineering literature is replete with references that portray the relationship with the 
mountains as romantic (e.g., Lester, 2004). Interpersonal relationships and the mountains are 
similar to the degree that both are perceived as chronically difficult and stressful, and reflect a 
prolonged emotional struggle. The difference between the two relationships is that in 
mountaineers’ interpersonal relationships, the emotions that are engendered are perceived as 
being dictated and driven by forces outside of their control (Lester, 1983; 2004); in the high-
risk domain, the emotions that are engendered are perceived as being dictated and driven by 
the self as an instinctively acting agent (cf. Lyng, 2005).  
If participants engage in a high-risk activity with the specific aim of experiencing 
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emotion regulation and agency then they should experience an emotion regulation and agency 
transfer, albeit temporary, from the high-risk development domain to important aspects of 
their everyday life (i.e., the target domain; Barnett & Ceci, 2002, Pain & Pain, 2005). 
Similarity between the development domain and the target domain is a critical determinant in 
maximizing transfer effects (Singley & Anderson, 1989). Thus, mountaineers’ engagement in 
an intensely emotional and active relationship with the mountains should help to maximize 
the effective transfer from the high-risk domain to emotional interpersonal relationships.  
Purpose of the present research 
The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the view that all high-risk activities 
are the same and motivated simply by sensation seeking. We aim to examine the different 
motives that drive participation in two contextually specific high-risk activities – skydiving 
and mountaineering – from sensation seeking, emotion regulation, and agency perspectives 
(Studies 2-4). We chose two specific activities that appear to typify either the sensation 
seeking model (skydiving) or the emotion regulation and agency model (mountaineering) 
with a view to being able to conduct a thorough investigation of the specific differences 
between two categories of high-risk activities. This was deemed necessary because many 
high-risk activities likely share some characteristics of both models and would thus cloud the 
potential differences between the two theoretical models. Due to the lack of a suitable 
measure in the existing literature, the initial task was to create a new scale that measured 
sensation seeking, emotion regulation and agency as motives for participation in a high-risk 
activity. 
Study 1 
Measuring Sensation Seeking. Zuckerman’s sensation seeking scale (SSS-V; 
Zuckerman, 1979) has become practically synonymous with risk-taking research and 
identifies the disposition, desire, or intention to engage in activities that Zuckerman assumes 
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provide unusual, novel, or intense sensations and experiences (Zuckerman, 2008). However, 
the almost exclusive use of the SSS-V has hampered research in understanding the motives 
that underlie participation in high-risk activities (e.g., Arnett, 1994). For example, despite 
what the name suggests, the Thrill and Adventure Seeking (TAS) subscale of the SSS-V does 
not measure thrill seeking per se. Rather, high TAS scores on the SSS-V reflect participants’ 
elevated propensity or desire to engage in certain high-risk activities (e.g., “I would like to try 
parachute jumping;” “I often wish I could be a mountain climber”). Given that many high-
risk participants already engage in such activities it is tautological and uninformative to 
report that high-risk participants report high scores on such scales (Llewellyn & Sanchez, 
2008; Slanger & Rudestam, 1997). Thus, there remains a need for a scale that measures 
sensation seeking as a motive for participation in high-risk activities.  
Measuring Emotion Regulation and Agency. There is currently no measure of 
emotion regulation and agency motives for participation in activities. To date, researchers 
have measured participants’ emotion regulation and agency via participant observation 
(Lester, 1983), qualitative inquiry (Woodman et al., 2010), and quantitative examination of 
constructs that appear to be related to emotion regulation (e.g., alexithymia; Woodman et al., 
2010) and agency (e.g., spheres of control; Woodman et al., 2010). Consequently, there 
remains a need for a scale that measures both emotion regulation and agency as motives for 
participation in (high-risk) activities.  
Development of a new inventory. High-risk participants generally have difficulty in 
clearly articulating the motives for their behavior (Loewenstein, 2007; Roberts, 1986; Smith, 
2005). This is likely because participation is driven by motives that are somewhat implicit. 
Consequently, explicit item stems such as “I participate because…” were deemed unsuitable 
for exploring the complex motives that may underpin engagement in high-risk activities. 
Instead, we determined to assess participants’ perceptions of their sensation needs, emotional 
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regulation, and agency before participation, their relevant experiences while participating, 
and the transfer benefits that they experienced as a consequence of their participation. The 
aim of Study 1 was thus to develop a measure that assessed participants’ experience of 
sensation seeking, emotion regulation and agency at three time points – before, while, and 
after participating in a high-risk activity – with a view to identifying how participants might 
differ in the need for sensation, emotion regulation, and agency as a function of their 
participation timeline.  
Method 
Participants. We first sought to develop and refine this three-factor scale by 
recruiting 295 individuals who participated in a diverse range of sports – both high-risk (e.g., 
skydiving, mountaineering, extreme skiing, rock climbing) and relatively low-risk (e.g., 
basketball, hockey, athletics) – and who varied in ability (beginners to professional athletes). 
The chance to win £20 (approximately US$32) on completion of all three online inventories 
was offered as an incentive. The final samples for each inventory were: before participating, 
n = 238 (194 men, 44 women; Mage = 28.58, SD = 9.09; Myears participating = 9.41, SD = 8.63); 
while participating, n = 244 (199 men, 45 women; Mage = 29.31, SD = 9.71; Myears participating = 
9.25, SD = 8.34); and after participating, n = 238 (196 men, 42 women; Mage = 28.52, SD = 
9.03; Myears participating = 9.53, SD = 9.03).  
Measures. The initial Sensation seeking, Emotion regulation and Agency Scale 
(SEAS) comprised three separate inventories: before participating (34 items), while 
participating (30 items), and after participating (31 items). The items within each inventory 
reflected the three proposed motivational factors – sensation seeking, emotion regulation and 
agency – and were developed by the authors on the basis of the theoretical perspective 
described in the general introduction. 
Sensation seeking items were concerned with: the need for sensation before 
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participating (e.g., Before participating, I want to get a physical buzz); the experience of 
sensation while participating (e.g., While participating, I get a rush of chemicals around my 
body that feels great); and the satisfaction of sensation need after participating (e.g., After 
participating, I am often buzzing from the adrenaline).  
Items pertaining to emotion regulation measured: a difficulty with emotion regulation 
before participating (e.g., Before participating, the emotional elements of my life are difficult 
to deal with); the experience of emotion regulation while participating (e.g., While 
participating, I have to deal with intense emotions); and a sense of emotion regulation after 
participating (e.g., After participating, I find intense emotions easier to deal with).  
Finally, items pertaining to agency measured: a diminished sense of agency before 
participating (e.g., Before participating, I feel like my life ‘belongs’ to other people); the 
experience of agency while participating (e.g., While participating, I am in charge); and a 
sense of agency after participating (e.g., After participating, I feel better about my ability to 
bring about important outcomes in my life). Participants responded to each item on a seven-
point Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).  
Procedure. Participants completed the survey online (cf. Mangunkusumo et al., 
2005). We used software (Qualtrics, 2009) that utilizes cookies and IP address tracking to 
prevent multiple responses from the same individual in any single study and the same 
individual from appearing in multiple studies. Participants completed demographic data 
pertaining to their three favorite participating activities (frequency, duration, ability/grade) 
and the three SEAS inventories (before, while, and after participating) with regard to their 
engagement in those activities. Where items said “in my life” participants were asked to think 
about elements of their life that were important to them (e.g., relationship with a partner, 
friends, family, and work).  
Analyses. Data were analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis partially in an 
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exploratory fashion. A model was considered a good fit to the data if the Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI, Bentler, 1990) and the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI, Tucker & Lewis, 1973) 
were greater than or equal to .95; the Root Mean Square Residual (RMSEA, Steiger & Lind, 
1980) was less than or equal to .06 (p > .05); the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR, Bentler, 1990) was less than or equal to .08; and the Satorra–Bentler (S-B) 2/df 
ratio was less than 2.00. 
Results 
Before participating inventory. Each of the three factors – sensation seeking (SS), 
emotion regulation (ER) and agency (AG) – was initially examined individually in order to 
retain only those items that were good indicators of their underlying latent variable (cf. 
Jöreskog, 1993). Post-hoc model modifications were carried out by examination of the 
standardized residuals, factor loadings, modification indices for theta-delta, and theoretical 
considerations. Single-factor CFA results indicated that the fit of the models to the data could 
be significantly improved by removing certain items. This iterative process led to the 
retention of six items in each factor, which revealed a good fit for the three-factor before 
participating full-model (see Table 1). Factor-factor correlations supported the discriminant 
validity between SS-ER (.08) and SS-AG (.12). Since the factor-factor correlation between 
ER-AG was moderately high (.83) we conducted a Satorra & Bentler (2001) scaled difference 
2 test (S-B 2diff) on the three-factor model (SS; ER; AG) and a re-specified two-factor 
model (SS; ER & AG). This test supported the discriminant validity of the ER and AG 
factors (S-B 2 diff (1) = 65.23, p < .001). The item-factor loadings for each subscale are 
displayed in Table 1.  
While participating inventory. The same testing procedure was used as detailed 
above. The iterative process revealed a good fit for a three-factor 18-item while participating 
full-model. Factor-factor correlations supported the discriminant validity between SS-ER 
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(.59) and ER-AG (.59). Although the SS-AG correlation was again moderately high (.85) a 
Satorra-Bentler scaled difference 2 test supported the discriminant validity of the SS and AG 
factors (S-B 2 diff (1) = 217.30, p < 0.01). The item-factor loadings for each subscale are 
displayed in Table 2.  
After participating inventory. The same procedures as described above yielded a 
good-fitting three-factor 18-item after participating full model: Factor-factor correlations 
supported the discriminant validity between SS-ER (.58) and SS-AG (.52). Again, although 
the ER-AG correlation was very high (.97) a Satorra-Bentler scaled difference 2 test 
supported the discriminant validity of the ER and AG factors (S-B 2 diff (1) = 5.39, p < 0.05). 
Nonetheless, .97 remains a large correlation that is worthy of attention. The item-factor 
loadings for each subscale are displayed in Table 3.  
Scale Confirmation 
Using the same method as described previously, we recruited 296 new participants to 
confirm the factor structure of the SEAS and to clarify the after participating factor structure. 
The diversity of activities represented, and the participant experience therein, closely 
mirrored that described previously. The final samples for each inventory were: before 
participating, n = 247 (199 men, 48 women; Mage = 28.96, SD = 9.78); while participating, n = 
261 (212 men, 49 women; Mage=29.56, SD = 10.44); after participating, n = 245 (192 men, 53 
women; Mage = 29.50, SD = 10.16). The procedure was the same as described previously and 
the fit indices replicated the good fit of each of the three-factor 18-item models (see Tables 1-
3). Also, factor-factor correlations supported the discriminant validity of the three-factor 
model for the before participating model (SS-AG = .08; SS-ER = .17; ER-AG = .80) and for 
the while participating model (SS-AG = .49; SS-ER = .71; ER-AG = .57). For the after 
participating inventory, the factor-factor correlations also supported the discriminant validity 
between SS-ER (.49) and SS-AG (.41). However, as with the first sample, the factor-factor 
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correlation between ER-AG was high (.99). A Satorra-Bentler scaled difference 2 test 
confirmed that constraining the correlations between factors to unity did not significantly 
impair the fit (S-B 2 diff (1) = .45, p > 0.50). The re-specified two-factor model (SS; ER & 
AG) demonstrated a good fit (see Table 3).  
Discussion 
The aim of Study 1 was to develop a new scale – the SEAS – to measure sensation 
seeking, emotion regulation and agency as motives for participating in a high-risk activity. 
The SEAS comprises three inter-related inventories that are completed retrospectively of 
participation and address percepts before participating, while participating, and after 
participating. The full models fit the data well and there was clear support for the three-factor 
structure – sensation seeking, emotion regulation and agency – in both the before 
participating and while participating inventories.  
Although the three-factor structure was also replicated in the after participating 
inventory for both samples, the factor-factor correlation between emotion regulation and 
agency was consistently high. Consequently the three-factor model – sensation seeking, 
emotion regulation, and agency – was rejected in favor of a two-factor model measuring 
sensation seeking and agentic emotion regulation. The constructs of agency and emotion 
regulation are somewhat conceptually interdependent since effective emotion regulation 
involves intentionally influencing one’s affective state and presumes active contributions to 
one’s emotional experience (cf. Gross, 1998). In other words, the emotionally regulated 
individual is an agent in that regulation process (Woodman et al., 2010) and, as such, 
moderate correlations between agency and emotion regulation were expected. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we sought to use the SEAS to discriminate the motives of mountaineers, 
skydivers, and a low-risk control group. Despite the strong sensation seeking focus, 
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skydiving clearly also requires a degree of agency and emotion regulation during the activity. 
Put simply, the skydiver who jumps from an airplane and demonstrates a complete failure to 
display agency and to regulate emotions will die. However, the emotion regulation and 
agency demands on the skydiver (e.g., regulating fear, controlling the body in free fall, 
opening the canopy) are limited, both in frequency and duration, compared to the same 
demands on the mountaineer. In the mountaineering domain, self-governing autonomous 
action and regulation of intense emotions is a requisite for survival throughout each day for 
days and weeks on end. As such, mountaineers should experience greater agentic and 
emotion regulation transfer effects than skydivers. 
Sensation seeking hypothesis. Skydivers, unlike mountaineers, are motivated by the 
sensation function of participation. Specifically, compared to both mountaineers and low-risk 
controls, skydivers will score significantly higher on: the need for sensation before 
participating; the experience of sensation while participating; and the satisfaction of sensation 
need after participating. Mountaineers and low-risk controls will not differ. 
Agency and emotion regulation hypothesis. Mountaineers, unlike skydivers, are 
motivated by the emotion regulation and agency function of participation. Specifically, 
compared to both skydivers and low-risk controls, mountaineers will score significantly 
higher on: difficulty with emotion regulation and diminished agency before participating; the 
experience of emotion regulation and experience of agency while participating; and agentic 
emotion regulation after participating. Given that a degree of emotion regulation and agentic 
action is a requisite for survival in the high-risk domain, we further hypothesize that 
skydivers will have a greater experience of emotion regulation and experience of agency than 
participants in low-risk activities. 
Method 
Participants. Study 2 participants were drawn from the Study 1 sample pools based 
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on the demographic information provided therein. Given that individuals who are 
professional high-risk instructors have been shown to display significantly different risk-
taking profiles to those engaged in high-risk activities for recreational purposes (Cazenave, 
Le Scanff, & Woodman, 2007), we removed professional instructors from both the skydiving 
and mountaineering samples. 
Skydivers were operationalized as individuals who had completed a minimum of 24 
jumps in the previous year. Thirty-five individuals satisfied these criteria (Myears participation = 
4.54, SD = 6.94; Mskydives/year = 113.46, SD = 94.13).  
Mountaineers were operationalized as individuals who went on expeditions for at 
least 15 days during an average year. Additionally, mountaineers had to have completed at 
least one expedition in the previous year that lasted a minimum of five days, at a minimum 
grade of AD- (International French Adjectival System) or equivalent. Twenty-eight 
individuals satisfied these criteria (Myears participation = 17.89, SD = 13.34; Mmountaineering days/year = 
50.82, SD = 48.83).  
Low-risk sport participants were defined as those individuals who had participated in 
low-risk sport (e.g., soccer, running, golf, basketball, hockey, etc.) at least 20 times in the 
previous year. Additionally, participants had to have not participated in activities defined as 
high-risk (e.g., rock climbing, paragliding, surfing) more than three times in the previous 
year. In order to produce an orthogonal design, we randomly selected 28 (14 from each 
sample) of the 53 control participants who satisfied these criteria (Myears participation = 9.35, SD 
= 6.60; Mparticipations/year = 95.00, SD = 60.19).  
The final samples comprised 35 experienced skydivers (29 men, 6 women; Mage = 
28.71, SD = 9.51), 28 mountaineers (23 men, 5 women; Mage = 38.04, SD = 15.61) and 28 
low-risk sport participants (17 men, 11 women; Mage = 26.14, SD = 6.58).  
Procedure. No additional data were required beyond those collected in Study 1.   
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Analyses. Each inventory (before, while, after) contained three dependent variables 
(sensation seeking, emotion regulation and agency) on which the three groups (mountaineers, 
skydivers, controls) were compared. Univariate analyses were preferred to multivariate 
analyses because the dependent variables were not considered as linear combinations of each 
other. Given that emotion regulation and agency were hypothesized to be the primary motives 
for mountaineers’ engagement in their activity while being only a correlate of skydivers’ 
sensation seeking motive, we used sensation seeking as a covariate when examining the 
extent to which the three groups differed in the experience of emotion regulation and agency. 
Results 
Sensation seeking. ANOVAs and Bonferroni tests revealed that skydivers’ motives 
were consistently higher in sensation seeking across the timeline. Specifically, skydivers 
reported: a significantly higher need for sensation than both mountaineers (p < .05) and 
controls (p < .01), who did not differ from each other (p > .50); a significantly greater 
experience of sensation than both mountaineers (p < .05) and controls (p < .001), who did not 
differ from each other (p = .17); and a significantly greater satisfaction of sensation need than 
both mountaineers (p < .05) and controls (p < .001), who did not differ from each other (p > 
.50). The results for each analysis are reported in Table 4.  
Emotion regulation. ANCOVAs and Bryant Paulson tests revealed no significant 
difference between the groups in difficulty with emotion regulation before participating. 
While participating, mountaineers and skydivers reported a greater experience of emotion 
regulation than the control group (p < .05) but did not significantly differ from each other.2 
Agency. ANCOVAs and Bryant Paulson tests revealed no significant difference 
between the groups in diminished agency before participating. While participating, 
                                                 
2 The assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was marginally violated (p = .05) 
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mountaineers and skydivers reported a greater experience of agency than the control group (p 
< .05) but did not significantly differ from each other. 
Transfer. ANCOVA and Bryant Paulson tests revealed that mountaineers reported 
significantly greater agentic emotion regulation transfer than both skydivers (p < .05) and the 
control group (p < .05), who did not differ from each another. 
Discussion 
The aim of Study 2 was to demonstrate that different risk-taking activities serve 
different motivational goals.  
Sensation seeking. As hypothesized, skydivers displayed a greater need for sensation 
(before), a greater experience of sensation (while), and a greater satisfaction of sensation 
need (after) than both mountaineers and low-risk controls, who were undifferentiated on all 
the sensation seeking factors. These results are the first clear indication that the consideration 
of high-risk activity participants as a homogeneous sensation seeking group (Zuckerman, 
2007) is an erroneous position. Indeed, the present study is the first empirical test, and 
subsequent rebuttal, of that uniform sensation seeking position.  
Emotion regulation and agency. As hypothesized mountaineers reported deriving an 
agentic emotion regulation transfer benefit after participation that skydivers and low-risk 
controls do not experience. These results provide the first empirical evidence that some high-
risk activities can provide a beneficial agentic emotion regulation transfer from the high-risk 
domain back into important aspects of everyday life.  
Although the beneficial transfer of agency and emotion regulation back into everyday 
life was clear, the emotion regulation and agency effects in the while participating and before 
participating data were rather less clear. As hypothesized, compared to the control group, 
both mountaineers and skydivers reported a greater experience of emotion regulation and 
experience of agency during the activity. However, the hypothesized differences between the 
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two types of risk-taking behavior did not emerge as significant. This result suggests that 
agentic action may be a requisite element of successful participation in the high-risk domain, 
regardless of the considerable contextual differences that exist between high-risk activities.  
The lack of emotion regulation difference between the two high-risk groups was 
somewhat more surprising, however, because highly regulated emotions appear somewhat 
incongruent with skydivers’ significantly elevated experience of sensation while 
participating. That is, a skydiver with high emotion regulation would likely experience 
jumping from an airplane as lacking in “thrill” (cf. Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004). Thus, 
we maintain that skydivers, unlike mountaineers, desire only to regulate their emotions to the 
extent that is necessary to ensure safe pursuit of their activity. Given this theoretical position 
– as well as the possibility of a type II error due to the relatively small sample size, and the 
violation of the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes – Study 2 warrants 
replication, with a larger sample size.  
Mountaineers also did not report significantly greater difficulty with emotion 
regulation or diminished agency before participating than skydivers or controls. There are 
two important considerations regarding this null finding. First, the lack of differences may be 
an artifact of the before inventory. That is, when considering before participating, participants 
may have considered only those moments immediately before participation. Such moments 
are associated with the pending (high-risk) experience rather than participants’ everyday life 
in the lead-up to the high-risk experience. However, the theoretical rationale for the 
mountaineers’ difficulty with agency and emotion regulation is thought to be more a 
reflection of their everyday life; that is, the difficulty is more between participations (when 
they have not participated for a significant period of time) than immediately before 
participating. We address this limitation in Study 3. 
The second potential explanation for the null differences in the before participating 
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data resides in participants’ perceptions of what it means to feel effective, in agentic and 
emotion regulation terms. We originally hypothesized that mountaineers would perceive that 
they have greater difficulty with emotion regulation and diminished agency in everyday life 
and the available evidence clearly points to such a struggle with the self in everyday life 
(Kirkpatrick, 2011; Lester, 2004). As such the important inter-participations difficulty for 
mountaineers is likely not simply in relation to other individuals, but also in relation to their 
degree of agency and emotion regulation compared to how they perceive that they ought to 
feel. Mountaineers have previously demonstrated a high need for control (Ewert, 1994), 
autonomy (Lester, 1983), self-determination (Frederick & Ryan, 1995), enjoyment of 
leadership roles (cf. Leon et al., 1989; Lester, 1983), and assertive individuality and 
dominance (Egan & Stelmack, 2003), particularly in interpersonal relationships (Lester, 
1983; Woodman et al., 2010). These characteristics may reflect an exaggerated expectancy of 
the emotion regulation and agency that such individuals perceive that they ought to 
experience as part of everyday life. According to such a position, mountaineers will seek out 
the experience of agency and emotion regulation in the high-risk domain because they desire 
to elevate agency and emotion regulation to a level that they feel is more normal for them. 
This issue is addressed and tested in Study 4. 
Although the SEAS appears to possess some discriminant validity, there is clearly a 
need to demonstrate concurrent validity also. For example, one would expect the SEAS 
factors to correlate moderately with established measures of sensation seeking, emotion 
regulation, and agency. Furthermore, one would expect them to correlate moderately with 
certain aspects of personality. Specifically, the need for sensation should correlate with 
extraversion (cf. Breivik, Roth, & Jørgensen, 1998) and – given the emotional difficulty 
associated with a lack of emotion regulation and agency – the difficulty with emotion 
regulation and diminished agency factors should correlate negatively with emotional stability. 
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Finally, given our critique of the misuse of traditional sensation seeking measures, 
there is also a need to demonstrate that the SEAS can discriminate the motives for high-risk 
activities where more traditional measures cannot. All these issues are addressed in Study 3. 
Study 3 
The aim of Study 3 was fourfold. First, by modifying the instruction set for the before 
participating inventory (from before participating to between participations) we aimed to 
test more precisely the hypothesis that mountaineers will experience significantly greater 
difficulty with emotion regulation and diminished agency – between participations.  
Second, we aimed to test the concurrent validity of the SEAS against established 
measures of sensation seeking, agency, emotion regulation, as well as personality. The third 
aim was to replicate the hypothesis and finding from Study 2 that sensation seeking is at the 
core of the motive for skydiving but is not a motive for mountaineers. Although it is 
theoretically misguided to expect Zuckerman's (1979) SSS-V to differentiate risk-taking 
groups on the basis of sensation seeking as a motive for behavior, this expectation remains to 
be dismissed empirically. As such, we aim to demonstrate empirically that: (a) the SSS-V is 
incapable of discriminating risk-taking groups on the basis of sensation seeking; (b) the 
SEAS discriminates risk-taking groups on the basis of need for sensation. 
Finally, we aimed to allay concerns that the mountaineers may have a naïve in-group 
perception of what it means to be a mountaineer by testing for group differences in social 
desirability.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited and operationalized as previously. The 
groups were: 41 skydivers (36 men, 5 women; Mage = 29.95, SD = 10.36; Myears participation = 
2.56, SD = 2.55; Mtotal jumps = 122.07, SD = 63.23); 39 mountaineers (35 men, 4 women; Mage 
= 30.36, SD = 7.60; Myears participation = 8.77, SD = 6.31; Mexpedition duration = 19.56 days, SD = 
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9.45; Mmountaineering days in previous year = 38.74, SD = 34.45); and 32 low-risk sport participants (31 
men, 1 woman; Mage = 35.53, SD = 13.70; Myears participation = 10.87, SD = 8.89; Mweeks in previous 
year that included sport participation = 39.78, SD = 20.02).  
Measures 
Motives for high-risk activities. Participants completed the previously validated 
before participating SEAS with one modification: Instead of asking participants to rate their 
need for sensation and their difficulty with agency and emotion regulation before 
participating, we asked them to rate these constructs in relation to how they feel between 
participations (When you have not participated for a significant period). This was to better 
capture participants’ experience of everyday life when they have not been participating in 
their high-risk activity. The inventory introduction emphasized that participants should define 
for themselves what they considered to be a significant period. Apart from this instruction, 
the inventory and the items remained unchanged. 
Sensation Seeking. The Sensation Seeking Scale-V (SSS-V; Zuckerman, 1979) 
comprises 10 forced-choice items for each of the four factors of Thrill and Adventure 
Seeking, Experience Seeking, Disinhibition, and Boredom Susceptibility. The SSS-V is the 
most widely used measure of sensation seeking (see Zuckerman, 2007).  
Emotion Regulation. We used the subscale of ability to regulate one’s own emotions 
from the Emotional Intelligence Scale (Tett, Fox, & Wang, 2005; e.g., I can keep myself calm 
even in highly stressful situations). This subscale comprises 12 items scored on a Likert scale 
from 1 (Disagree very much) to 6 (Agree very much).  
Agency. We used the Lack of Mastery subscale from Pearlin and Schooler’s (1978) 
inventory, which comprises seven items (e.g., I have little control over the things that happen 
to me) scored on a Likert scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).  
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Personality. The Ten-item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003) measures the big five personality constructs of extraversion, conscientiousness, 
openness to new experience, emotional stability, and agreeableness, and comprises two items 
for each of the five factors, scored on a Likert scale from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree 
strongly).  
Social Desirability. We used the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(Paulhus, 1994) to measure social desirability. This inventory comprises 20 items measuring 
self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., I never regret my decisions) and 20 items measuring 
impression management (e.g., I never cover up my mistakes) scored on a Likert scale from 1 
(not true) to 7 (very true).  
Procedure. The same procedure was followed as that described previously except for 
the additional measures.  
Results 
The correlations are displayed in Table 5. As expected, the need for sensation 
correlated with sensation seeking; the difficulty with emotion regulation correlated with 
emotion regulation; and diminished agency correlated with lack of mastery. Furthermore, the 
need for sensation was correlated with extraversion, and both diminished agency and 
difficulty with emotional regulation were negatively correlated with the personality trait of 
emotional stability.  
The groups were not discriminated on the basis of either of the SEAS factors of 
difficulty with emotion regulation or diminished agency alone (see Table 6), which replicates 
the results of Study 2 and confirms that these null effects were not simply an artifact of the 
instruction wording (i.e., before participating or between participations). 
As expected, ANOVAs revealed skydivers demonstrated a significantly greater need 
for sensation than mountaineers (p < .001). Importantly, and unsurprisingly, the total SSS-V 
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and each of its subscales were unsuccessful in discriminating between the two high-risk 
activities (ps > .50). ANCOVA and Bryant Paulson tests revealed that, controlling for the 
SSS-V sensation seeking, the SEAS need for sensation difference between the high-risk 
activities groups remained. Specifically, skydivers demonstrated a significantly greater need 
for sensation than mountaineers (p < .01). None of the big five personality factors 
discriminated the two high-risk activities (see Table 6). Finally, a multiple logistic regression 
analysis revealed that the combined SSS-V subscales were unable to predict high-risk activity 
group (i.e., mountaineer or skydiver) while need for sensation significantly predicted group 
membership over and above the SSS-V (p = .002; see Table 7). All tests for multicollinearity 
were within acceptable limits.   
There were no significant impression management social desirability differences 
between the groups. Although skydivers reported significantly elevated self-deception 
enhancement compared to controls (p < .01), they did not differ from mountaineers (p > .50). 
Finally, when controlling for self-deception enhancement, ANCOVA and Bryant Paulson  
tests revealed that skydivers continued to report significantly greater need for sensation than 
mountaineers (p < .01) and controls (p < .01).  
Discussion 
In support of the concurrent validity of the SEAS and as hypothesized, the SEAS 
factors correlated with established measures of sensation seeking, emotion regulation, and 
agency, as well as personality measures. The results also demonstrated that the need for 
sensation differences between the two high-risk activities cannot be explained by social 
desirability differences between these groups. Interestingly, the personality construct of 
conscientiousness discriminated the mountaineers from the control group and provides 
further evidence that high-risk activities cannot be classified as uniform hedonic behavior.  
Finally, Study 3 replicated the finding that sensation seeking is at the core of the 
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motive for skydiving but is not a motive for mountaineers. Specifically, as in Study 2, the 
SEAS was successful in demonstrating that the need for sensation is the principal motive for 
high-risk activities such as skydiving, but not for high-risk activities such as mountaineering. 
Importantly, the results from the present study align with a large body of research (see 
Zuckerman, 2007) that reveals that the SSS-V does not discriminate between participants of 
high-risk sports. Thus, the SEAS is superior to the SSS-V for the examination of the specific 
sensation seeking motive for high-risk activities and any such differences between them.  
Study 4 
The aim of Study 4 was twofold. First, we aimed to retest the hypotheses from Study 
2 using a larger sample. Second and of more central interest, given that mountaineers are 
thought to have greater expectations about agency and emotion regulation experience in 
everyday life, we aimed to test the multivariate hypothesis that mountaineers will have 
greater difficulty with emotion regulation and greater emotion regulation expectancy than 
both skydivers and low-risk controls. Similarly, we aimed to test the multivariate hypothesis 
that mountaineers will have diminished agency and enhanced agency expectancy than both 
skydivers and low-risk controls.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited and operationalized as previously. The 
groups were: 100 skydivers (68 men, 32 women; Mage = 29.19, SD = 9.01; Myears participation = 
4.12, SD = 4.21; Mjumps in previous year = 70.71, SD = 49.16); 46 mountaineers (37 men, 9 
women; Mage = 30.24, SD = 8.61; Myears participation = 9.63, SD = 8.11; Mexpedition duration = 17.60 
days, SD = 12.72; Mmountaineering days in previous year = 36.83, SD = 27.81); and 47 low-risk sport 
participants (29 men, 18 women; Mage = 29.04, SD = 12.33; Myears participation = 14.64, SD = 
7.69; Msport days in previous year 184.28, SD = 125.27).  
Measures and Procedure. Participants completed demographic data and the SEAS 
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as in Study 2. The change of wording from before participating to between participations, 
implemented in Study 3, was maintained. The modification was the addition of a Likert scale 
in the between participations inventory to measure participants’ expectancy regarding their 
experience of emotion regulation and agency, between bouts of participation. This was to 
enable us to test the multivariate hypothesis. We clarified this scale further by asking 
participants to consider the phrase, “are you agitated by the way things are or are you quite 
happy to feel the way you do?” Responses were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale from 
1 (It’s OK to feel like this) to 7 (I ought not to feel like this).  
Results 
Sensation seeking. ANOVA and Bonferroni tests replicated the findings from Study 
2. That is, skydivers reported: a significantly greater need for sensation than both 
mountaineers (p < .05) and controls (p < .05), who did not differ from one another (p > .50); a 
significantly greater experience of sensation than both mountaineers (p < .001) and controls 
(p < .01), who did not differ from one another (p > .50); and a significantly greater 
satisfaction of sensation need than both mountaineers (p < .001) and controls (p < .05), who 
did not differ (p > .50). The details of each analysis are reported in Table 8.  
Emotion Regulation difficulty and expectancy. ANCOVAs and Bryant Paulson 
tests revealed that mountaineers reported significantly greater experience of emotion 
regulation than both skydivers (p < .05) and controls (p < .05) during participation. 
Furthermore, skydivers reported significantly greater experience of emotion regulation than 
controls (p < .05). This result confirms the original hypothesis from Study 2.  
Univariate ANOVAs replicated the null hypothesis from Study 3 as expected: there 
were no significant differences between the groups in difficulty with emotion regulation 
between participations, F(2, 190) = 2.60, p = .08. We thus proceeded with tests of the 
multivariate hypotheses. MANOVA revealed a significant difference in difficulty with 
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emotion regulation and emotion regulation expectancy between skydivers, mountaineers and 
controls (see Table 8). Discriminant function analysis (DFA) yielded two discriminant 
functions. The first generated function – accounting for 94.4% of the total between-groups 
variability – revealed that perceptions of emotion regulation between participations 
discriminated between the mountaineers, skydivers, and controls, Wilks’ Λ = 0.95, 2 (4, n = 
193) = 10.63, p < .05. The standardized structure coefficients for the first discriminant 
function revealed that both variables made a significant contribution to the discriminant 
function. However, emotion regulation expectancy (r = 1.00) made the greatest contribution 
to the discriminant function, followed by difficulty with emotion regulation (r = .69). 
Examination of the discriminant function at group centroids revealed that mountaineers (.37) 
had a higher expectancy of emotion regulation and greater difficulty with emotion regulation 
than both the skydivers (-.19) and controls (.05), who were not discriminated from each other. 
Agency difficulty and expectancy. ANCOVA revealed that both mountaineers and 
skydivers reported significantly greater experience of agency than the control group (p < .05) 
but did not significantly differ from one another.  
Univariate ANOVAs replicated the null hypothesis from Study 3 as expected: there 
were no significant differences between the groups in diminished agency between 
participations, F(2, 190) = 0.97, p = .38. We thus proceeded with tests of the multivariate 
hypotheses. MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate difference in diminished agency 
and agency expectancy between the groups (see Table 8). Discriminant function analysis 
again yielded two discriminant functions, but the first generated function accounted for 100% 
of the total between-groups variability, which revealed that perceptions of agency between 
participations discriminated between mountaineers, skydivers, and controls, Wilks’ Λ = 0.95, 
2 (4, n = 193) = 10.57, p < .05. The standardized structure coefficients for the first 
discriminant function suggested that both variables made a significant contribution to the 
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discriminant function. However, agency expectancy (.98) made the greatest contribution to 
the discriminant function, followed by diminished agency (.42). Examination of the 
discriminant function at group centroids revealed that mountaineers (.43) had a greater 
expectation of agency and a diminished sense of agency than both the skydivers (-.13) and 
controls (-.14), who were not discriminated from each other.  
Transfer. ANCOVA and Bryant Paulson test confirmed that the difference between 
the groups in agentic emotion regulation remained significant after controlling for 
satisfaction of sensation need, thus confirming the hypothesis and finding from Study 2: 
Mountaineers reported significantly greater agentic emotion regulation than both skydivers (p 
< .05) and control groups (p < .05), who did not differ from one another (p > .05). 
Discussion 
Replication of Study 2 results 
Sensation Seeking. The present study replicated all the sensation seeking findings 
from Study 2. Specifically, skydivers reported significantly greater need for sensation, 
experience of sensation and satisfaction of sensation need than both mountaineers and low-
risk controls. Although some high-risk activities are clearly motivated by sensation seeking, 
others clearly are not motivated by sensation seeking.  
Emotion Regulation and Agency. Study 4 replicated the results from Study 2: 
Mountaineers derive an agentic emotion regulation transfer benefit after participation that 
skydivers and low-risk controls do not experience. Study 4 also provided support for the 
hypothesis that mountaineers have a significantly greater experience of emotion regulation 
than skydivers while participating. This suggests that mountaineers, unlike skydivers, are 
primarily motivated to seek out the experience of emotion regulation in the high-risk domain. 
Furthermore, as hypothesized, Study 4 demonstrated that a degree of emotion regulation is 
also experienced by skydivers thus suggesting that even participation in high-sensation high-
Motives for high-risk activities 30 
  
risk sports requires an element of emotion regulation. However, since overly regulated 
emotions may attenuate the in situ experience of sensation (Campos et al., 2004), skydivers 
likely aim to regulate their emotions only to the degree that it enables them to operate safely 
in the high-risk domain. Conversely, the experience of emotion regulation is central to 
mountaineers’ engagement with their activity. 
Consistent with Study 2, Study 4 revealed that the experience of agency is an 
important facet of participation in high-risk sport. Indeed, both mountaineers and skydivers 
reported a significantly greater experience of agency than low-risk controls, and did not 
significantly differ from one another. This result consistently contrasts with the initial 
hypothesis that stated that mountaineers would experience greater agency than skydivers 
while participating. We interpret this consistent result as a reflection of the need for skydivers 
to deploy agentic action with a view to decreasing the likelihood of error, which could be 
potentially fatal. Importantly, agency in this context does not detract from the experience of 
sensation.  
Study 4 confirmed the hypothesis and finding that only mountaineers glean a positive 
agentic emotion regulation transfer effect from the high-risk domain back into important 
aspects of everyday life. As in Study 2, mountaineers reported significantly elevated agentic 
emotion regulation compared to both skydivers and controls, who did not differ. Despite both 
mountaineers and skydivers undergoing a statistically similar experience of agency while 
participating, as in Study 2, skydivers did not experience a positive agentic emotion 
regulation transfer effect. Indeed, as proposed throughout, this is likely due to the experience 
of agency merely being a requisite for successful engagement with the high-risk domain 
rather than a motive for engagement. Furthermore, since skydiving is of relatively short 
duration, the associated experience of agency is likely too brief to provide any meaningful 
transfer of agentic emotion regulation into everyday life. Thus, future research that 
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establishes whether there is an optimum participatory duration for maximizing transfer 
effects would be worthwhile. Additionally, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether 
there is a limit of constancy and intensity of the agentic and emotional challenges faced 
during participation below which there is likely to be no agentic emotion regulation transfer 
effect. 
Great expectations 
We added an expectancy scale with a view to testing the hypothesis that it is the 
combination of mountaineers’ greater expectancy of agency and emotion regulation and their 
difficulty with agency and emotion regulation in everyday life that is the primary motivation 
for participation. The multivariate combination of expectancy and difficulty in relation to 
both agency and emotion regulation successfully discriminated the groups, with expectancy 
being consistently the most important discriminator. That is, mountaineers had a higher 
expectation of emotion regulation and a greater difficulty with emotion regulation than both 
skydivers and controls. Thus, the lack of support for the uni-dimensional difficulty with 
emotion regulation and diminished agency hypotheses in Study 2 was an artifact of not 
considering mountaineers’ greater expectations of what degree of emotion regulation and 
agency they feel they ought to experience in life.  
High-risk activities, as exemplified here by mountaineering, can thus be motivated 
more by greater expectations of both emotion regulation and agency than by a greater 
difficulty with emotion regulation or a diminished sense of agency per se. The results provide 
the first evidence that some high-risk participants actively engage in the high-risk domain in 
order to glean an experience of agency and emotion regulation that satisfies a higher-than-
normal perception of what life should provide in those terms.  
In the context of the mountaineer, the attractiveness and function of the high-risk 
domain is that it provides the individual with a domain that physically challenges the limits of 
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the self in a way that is not readily available in even the most challenging of normative 
everyday situations, and where success requires a degree of emotion regulation and agency 
that is consistent with such a challenge. Based on Shackleton’s journals and on interviews 
with the surviving members of the failed 1914 expedition to the South Pole, Lansing (1959) 
noted that it was only during Antarctic expeditions that Shackleton found “a burden which 
challenged every atom of his strength”, whereas in everyday life, “Shackleton’s tremendous 
capacity for boldness and daring found almost nothing worthy of its pulling power” (p. 13). 
Once mountaineers have “enjoyed” a prolonged and difficult test of their agency and emotion 
regulation ability, they will feel more aligned with the agency and emotional experience that 
they feel ought to pervade their everyday life.   
General Discussion 
The aim of the present research was twofold: (a) to challenge the widely held view 
that high-risk participants can be considered a homogenous sensation seeking group; and (b) 
to understand the underlying motives for high-risk long-duration low-sensation activities such 
as mountaineering. A measure of sensation seeking, emotion regulation and agency as 
motives for participation did not exist before this research. As such, we first developed the 
measure and then tested the hypotheses using that measure.  
Study 1 charted the creation and initial validation of the Sensation seeking, Emotion 
regulation, and Agency Scale (SEAS), which comprises three inter-related inventories, 
completed retrospectively in relation to percepts of between participations, while 
participating, and after participating. The three-factor structure (Sensation seeking, Emotion 
regulation, Agency) was confirmed for the between and while participating inventories and 
rejected in favor of a two-factor structure (Sensation seeking; Agentic emotion regulation) for 
the after participating inventory. In Studies 2-4 we implemented the SEAS to test the 
hypothesized differential motives of mountaineers, skydivers, and low-risk controls. Study 3 
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confirmed that these differences could not be attributed to the established measure of 
sensation seeking.  
The present research demonstrates for the first time that there exist different motives 
for what has been long considered a single category of voluntary risk-taking. Some risk-
takers (e.g., skydivers) are motivated by the sensation rewards of their activity, and others 
(e.g., mountaineers) are motivated by the agentic emotion regulation processes of their 
activity. This latter motivation is especially informative, as it suggests that risk-takers can be 
motivated by the possibility of a better future state through an elevated expectancy of their 
intra-personal and inter-personal life. In such cases, the compensatory function of the high-
risk domain is that individuals expect to experience greater emotion regulation and agency 
during their high-risk activity compared to their other life domains. Finally, and importantly 
for understanding the perceived benefits of engaging with the high-risk domain, the agentic 
emotion regulation that is enjoyed post-participation suggests that such benefits are perceived 
to transfer to other important aspects of everyday life. In other words, by being an agent of 
their emotion regulation in a high-stress environment for a prolonged period of time, 
individuals feel better able to agentically regulate their emotions in other prolonged high-
stress environments that they face in everyday life (cf. Woodman et al., 2010). This is 
important because such a process suggests that individuals can learn from the high-risk 
environment and transfer their coping skills back into their everyday life.  
High-risk activities and high-risk sports in particular have received minimal attention 
from personality theorists, likely because they have long been perceived simply as a single 
category of sensation seeking, much like substance abuse or sexual promiscuity. The present 
research opens up the possibility for researchers to explore the potential considerable lessons 
that might be learned, and the benefits that might be gleaned, from understanding the 
processes that underpin the engagement in high-risk sports. Importantly, risk-taking in the 
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present research involves risk that is very much personal. That is, these are not roulette-style 
caution-to-the-wind risks that implicate little of the person; these are, literally, full-bodied 
risks that engage and risk the person’s life. The present research also stands to inform 
research on the potential mechanisms that might underlie engaging with outdoor activities, 
most of which has revealed simply that such activities can have a positive effect on self-
concept (e.g., Hattie, Marsh, Neil, & Richards, 1997). The processes of emotion regulation 
and agency could explain such a benefit, although this clearly warrants research attention.  
Great Expectations 
Mountaineers’ greater emotion regulation and agency expectancies of everyday life 
are a significant step forward in understanding the motivation that drives individuals’ 
repeated striving for higher and harder achievements. It appears that such individuals are less 
satisfied with their lot and seek in the high-risk domain a means of achieving more from life. 
Individuals with such high expectations of themselves likely stand to have either a very 
fulfilling life or a very unfulfilling life with little in the way of achievement middle ground. 
That is, individuals who strive for ever-higher (metaphorical and sometimes literal) ground 
will either achieve such aspirations or will fall short, which could lead to two very divergent 
life paths. The history of Mount Everest and two of its most celebrated climbers provides a 
striking illustration of these potential divergent paths.  
Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing Norgay were the first people to summit 
Mount Everest in 1953, 29 years after George Mallory’s fateful attempt. Hillary’s significant 
post-mountaineering accomplishments suggest that his positive goal striving and expectations 
of life extended far beyond the mountaineering domain. For example, Hillary became the first 
person to reach the North pole, the South pole, and the summit of Everest; he subsequently 
became New Zealand high commissioner to India (Johnston, 2008). He has since been named 
by Time magazine as one of the 100 most influential people of the 20th century. Hillary’s 
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example illustrates that risk-takers’ high expectations of life can result in a very fulfilling life.  
There is, however, a darker side to such high expectations in this domain. For 
example, there are a plethora of cases of mountaineers’ depression and alcoholism in the 
literature. Accounts of Tenzing Norgay’s (Hillary’s Everest climbing partner) life certainly 
describe an uncompromising pursuit of excellence, which, like Hilary, continued into other 
life spheres – but with mixed success. For example, although Norgay became director of the 
Himalayan Mountaineering Institute (Douglas, 2003), he perceived that forces outside of his 
control (e.g., work and family) impinged on his ambitions. For much of his life Norgay had 
been a moderate drinker, but in his later life he went through bouts of excessive drinking and 
“his last years were characterized by unhappiness and depression” (Douglas, 2003, p. 274). 
For two mountaineers who had enjoyed and shared what was considered the ultimate 
achievement in the mountaineering domain, the contrast in their subsequent lives is stark.  
Depending on different opportunities for fulfilling achievement aims, individuals may 
perceive that their only recourse to satisfying emotion regulation and agency needs is via 
more anti-social high-risk means such as criminal acts, reckless driving, drug use, etc. (cf. 
Klonsky, 2007). The potential convergence of the motivational processes that underlie such 
seemingly divergent activities certainly warrants research attention. Specifically, if antisocial 
risk-takers (e.g., criminals) were given opportunities to express their emotion regulation and 
agency needs in a high-risk constructive environment, it is possible that some of the risk-
taking benefits revealed in the present studies might help such individuals to engage in more 
constructive activities. In other words, the high-risk domain might be used as a learning 
ground for the self.  
It is interesting to note that mountaineers’ high expectations in the current studies 
share some of the characteristics of perfectionism, which, in its adaptive form, has been 
shown to be positively associated with achievement (Kobori, Yoshie, Kudo, & Ohtsuki, 
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2011; Rice & Mirzadeh, 2000). Thus, if managed in an adaptive manner, a high expectancy 
of emotion regulation and agency may have a facilitative effect across multiple domains of a 
participant’s life. Specifically, an individual with both adequate self-complexity (Larkin & 
Griffiths, 2004) and self-efficacy (Bandura, 2006) should demonstrate positive striving in 
multiple compensatory activities across numerous domains (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1998). The 
extent to which high-risk participants’ high expectancies reflect an adaptive form of 
perfectionism is an interesting avenue for future research.  
Conversely, the potential downward achievement spiral that might follow an inability 
to transfer the agency and emotion regulation benefits gleaned from the high-risk activity 
back into everyday life likely would lead to an impoverished life outside of the high-risk 
domain. Research that sheds light on the factors that moderate the ability of high-risk activity 
participants to translate their high achievement in the high-risk domain to other life domains 
certainly appears worthwhile. Equally, the extent to which one can benefit from engagement 
with high-risk activities as a way of elevating achievement standards appears worthy of 
research attention.  
 Beyond Risk: Implications for Personality Science. The SEAS was developed 
because there was no measure in the literature that specifically measures sensation seeking, 
emotion regulation or agency as motives for behavior. Although we were specifically 
interested in high-risk behavior, the measure can clearly be used for all behavior for which 
any of these three factors are thought to be at the core of the underlying motive. Furthermore, 
the implications of the present research extend considerably beyond risk-taking research, 
especially as this research answers a longstanding call for studies that move beyond the 
examination of college samples to examine participants’ real-life behavior (Baumeister, 
Vohs, & Funder, 2010; Carlson, 1971; Furr, 2009). Specifically, in contrast to most studies of 
personality where the researcher determines the setting and the associated behavior, the 
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present paradigm places participants’ personality at the centre of their spontaneously chosen 
behaviors and thus provides the possibility for an intricate understanding of the link between 
individual differences and behavior. In other words, in developing conceptual frameworks 
that drill down into the detail of what is specifically involved in engaging in behavior (i.e., 
the people and what they “do”), we stand to pave more completely the complex path between 
personality (in all its intricacy) and people’s spontaneous behaviors (in all their intricacy; 
Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2010). The present in-depth investigation of specific individual 
motives and behaviors has allowed us to understand that the motives for seemingly similar 
behaviors can in fact be quite different from the theoretical framework with which 
personality researchers may have become comfortably accustomed. In the specific context of 
the present data, it is clear that people who spontaneously and actively engage with risk are 
not simply “sensation seekers.” It is likely that other behaviors in personality research that 
have received a similarly glossed-over classification (e.g., pro-social behaviors; Gomà-i-
Freixanet, 2001) would also benefit from a finer grained analysis of the specific perceived 
benefits that individuals glean from the specific behaviors in which they engage, or indeed 
the specific threats that they perceive from not engaging in such behaviors. If we are to move 
beyond simplistic conceptualizations of complex behavior, and the contribution of individual 
differences therein, then personality researchers clearly need to embrace this complex 
challenge.  
Methodological and Measurement Implications. These results have important 
implications for the continued study of motives for participation in high-risk activities. First, 
researchers should question the appropriateness of making inferences regarding the motives 
for participation in high-risk activities when the sample is drawn from a diverse range of 
high-risk activities and subsequently treated as a homogeneous sensation seeking group. 
Indeed, based on the present results, such methods may be a source of confound for much of 
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the extant literature.  
Second, the present research offers a methodologically valid avenue for investigating 
the motives for different activities. To date, the SSS-V (Zuckerman, 1979) has frequently 
been used for this purpose with high-risk activities. However, the SSS-V was neither 
designed for, nor capable of, measuring motives for different activities; it is simply a measure 
of the desire or propensity to engage in high-sensation activities and clearly has no place for 
the study of motives for such activities, especially when participants already engage in such 
activities. The lack of a suitable measure of sensation seeking motives has also been a 
limitation for previous research into specific high-risk samples. For example, with a view to 
understanding the specific anxiety regulation mechanisms in high-risk sport, researchers 
recently attempted to control for sensation seeking (e.g., Woodman, Cazenave, & Le Scanff, 
2008; Woodman, Huggins, Le Scanff and Cazenave, 2009). These studies demonstrated that, 
after controlling for scores on the SSS-V, skydiving served a specific anxiety regulation 
function for alexithymic individuals only. The question remains: do skydivers enjoy such 
anxiety regulation once sensation as a motive for participation (i.e., using the SEAS) is 
controlled? The present data suggest that the skydivers’ emotion regulation reported in 
Woodman et al. (2009) was likely a reflection of a more salient underlying need for 
sensation. Thus, researchers would do well to distinguish between sensation seeking motives 
– in which case the SEAS would be appropriate – or attempts to study the propensity or 
desire to participate in so-called sensation seeking activities – in which case the SSS-V 
would be appropriate.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research. One limitation of the present 
studies is the retrospective data collection method utilized. That is, participant responses may 
have fluctuated as a function of the time elapsed since their previous participation in their 
chosen activity (cf. Yin, 2003) and this was not standardized across participants in the present 
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design. Despite this limitation, we preferred retrospective data collection since this method 
tends to evaluate the individual’s overall perception of the activity and thus has greater 
potential for examining the motives for repeated engagement in an activity (Stuart & Hull, 
1992). Since implementation of the SEAS is not limited to methodologies employing 
retrospective data collection, one solution to this limitation – and an interesting direction for 
future research – would be to employ the SEAS inventories in a prospective repeated 
measures design. Such a design would enable examination of the duration of the agentic 
emotion regulation transfer benefit and the satisfaction of sensation need gleaned as a result 
of participation. Furthermore, the factors that determine and maximize the magnitude of these 
benefits – for example the duration, intensity, and danger of the activity – could be addressed 
via such designs (cf. Norris & Weinman, 1996). Of course, such questions are not limited to 
the investigation of high-risk activities and the between participations SEAS could be used 
for research on the motives for other activities for which there are thought to be sensation 
seeking, agency, or emotion regulation functions.  
The present internet based data collection was limited by the strict safeguards that we 
established to prevent multiple responses from the same individual. We utilized “cookies” 
and “IP tracking” to ensure that participants were not duplicating responses. Such a solution 
to this potential problem is not without its own shortcomings, as potential participants may 
have inadvertently been excluded from the study when trying to complete the inventory from 
shared facilities. Despite this safeguard, one remaining statistical threat was the potential for 
participants to provide false information pertaining to their participation in high-risk activities 
and ability levels therein. Of course this potential problem is not limited to the use of e-
questionnaires, and beyond demanding proof of claimed participation and ability there is 
clearly no failsafe solution. Furthermore, that the hypothesized effects received consistent 
support across studies considerably mitigates this limitation. 
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Conclusion. The findings in this paper provide consistent evidence that risk-takers are 
not, and should not be considered as, a homogenous group motivated by sensation seeking 
rewards. Some risk-takers – as exemplified by skydivers – are indeed motivated by the 
sensations of the activity. Other risk-takers – as exemplified by mountaineers – are motivated 
by the heightened emotion regulation and agency functions provided by the high-risk domain. 
The high-risk domain has the potential to provide a compelling illustration of how to live to 
one’s potential and for each person to climb his/her own personal Mount Everest: 
If you cannot understand that there is something in man which responds to the 
challenge of this mountain and goes out to meet it, that the struggle is the struggle of 
life itself upward and forever upward, then you won’t see why we go (Mallory, 1924). 
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Table 1. 
Item-Factor loadings and model fit indices for the Between Participations Sensation seeking, 
Emotion regulation and Agency Scale (SEAS) in Study 1. 
BETWEEN PARTICIPATIONS, when I have not participated for a significant period… 
 
Sensation Seeking 
Sample 1 Sample 2 
I want to get an adrenaline rush .72 .57 
I look forward to getting a physical thrill from participating .70 .80 
I look forward to the “rush” I hope to experience during participation  .84 .76 
I want to get a physical buzz .83 .91 
I look forward to the physical sensations I will experience during 
participation 
.72 .80 
I feel the need to do something intensely stimulating .59 .57 
Coefficient alpha .87 .87 
 
Emotion Regulation 
  
The emotional elements of my life are difficult to deal with .74 .75 
I am emotional (e.g. anxious, angry) without understanding why .69 .73 
I struggle to deal with stressful situations in my life .76 .78 
I can’t work out which emotion I am experiencing .56 .65 
I find that emotional situations in my life stress me out .71 .76 
I feel worried about other aspects of my life, not related to the task .66 .70 
Coefficient alpha .84 .87 
 
Agency 
  
I am prevented from achieving my goals in life .64 .67 
I feel like a passive observer of my life rather than a major “actor” .70 .65 
I feel like people or circumstances are trying to impose limits on me .67 .63 
I feel like my life “belongs” to other people .71 .66 
I feel trapped  .77 .78 
I have little belief in my ability to influence some important aspects 
of my life 
.76 
 
.76 
Coefficient alpha .86 .85 
 
Three-factor Model Fit Indices 
  
S-B χ2 (132) 231.40 244.00 
CFI .97 .96 
NNFI  
RMSEA 
SRMR 
.96 
.06 (p = .20) 
.05 
.96 
.06 (p = .11) 
.06 
Notes: For Sample 1, the wording for the item stem was simply: “Before participating…” 
S-B = Satorra-Bentler; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index; RMSEA = Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual. 
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Table 2.  
Item-Factor loadings and model fit indices for the While Participating Sensation seeking, 
Emotion regulation and Agency Scale (SEAS) in Study 1.  
WHILE PARTICIPATING…   
 
Sensation Seeking 
Sample 1 Sample 2 
I enjoy getting a physical thrill .82 .74 
I experience intense excitement .67 .64 
I like to get a physiological buzz .85 .75 
I enjoy the sensations I experience .71 .57 
I get a rush of chemicals around my body that feels great .65 .76 
I experience physical sensations which feel great .86 .77 
Coefficient alpha .88 .85 
 
Emotion Regulation 
  
My emotions are sometimes very intense .55 .59 
I have to deal with stressful situations .57 .51 
I have to manage my fear  .52 .53 
I prove to myself that I can deal with stressful situations .61 .67 
I have to deal with intense emotions .75 .69 
The emotions I experience are more intense than in other areas of my 
life 
.51 .52 
Coefficient alpha .75 .75 
 
Agency 
  
If a difficult situation arises I feel able to deal with it .49 .39 
I am free from the constraints imposed on me in the rest of my life .41 .53 
I choose how far to push when I am scared .68 .40 
I am in charge .65 .50 
My actions and decisions prevent undesired outcomes from 
happening 
.54 .47 
No-one can force me to do something I don’t want to do .48 .62 
Coefficient alpha .70 .64 
 
Three-factor Model Fit Indices 
  
S-B χ2 (132) 
CFI  
NNFI  
RMSEA 
SRMR 
223.32 
.96 
.96 
.05 (p = .31) 
.07 
224.84 
.94 
.94 
.05 (p = .38) 
.07 
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Table 3. 
Item-factor loadings and model fit indices for the After Participating Sensation seeking, 
Emotion regulation and Agency Scale (SEAS) in Study 1. 
AFTER PARTICIPATING…   
 
Sensation Seeking 
Sample 1 Sample 2 
I enjoy the feeling of adrenaline flowing around my body .73 .74 
I feel like I have satisfied my immediate need for thrill .69 .57 
I am often buzzing from the adrenaline .84 .84 
I remember how good the sensations felt during participation and want to 
experience them again  
.66 .56 
I enjoy the rush of chemicals still flowing round my body .84 .88 
I look back and think how much I enjoyed the rush .81 .71 
Coefficient alpha .89 .87 
 
Agentic Emotion Regulation 
Coefficient alpha 
 
 
.95 
 
 
.92 
(Agency)   
I feel more able to deal with stressful situations in my life .74 .67 
I feel I have demonstrated that I can deal with intense emotions  .70 .67 
I find intense emotions easier to deal with .82 .80 
I find it easier to deal with stressful situations in my life .80 .75 
I feel better for having experienced my emotions  .69 .53 
I feel better able to deal with aspects of my life that would normally make 
me feel emotional (e.g., anxious, angry) 
.78 .74 
Coefficient alpha 
 
.89 .89 
(Emotion regulation)   
I have a calmness that carries over into other aspects of my life .58 .49 
I am more confident that I can affect those aspects of my life that are 
important to me 
.82 .80 
I am more confident about facing challenges in other aspects of my life .81 .79 
I feel more influential in how events in my life unfold .87 .80 
I feel better about my ability to bring about important outcomes in my life .83 .73 
I feel more able to prevent difficulties occurring in other aspects of my life .81 .75 
Coefficient alpha .91 .87 
 
Three-factor Model Fit Indices 
  
S-B χ2 (132) 
CFI  
NNFI  
RMSEA 
SRMR 
228.24 
.98 
.97 
.06 (p = 22) 
.06 
234.19 
.97 
.96 
.06 (p = .18) 
.07 
 
Two-factor Model Fit Indices 
  
S-B χ2 (132) 
CFI  
NNFI  
RMSEA 
SRMR 
233.75 
.98 
.97 
.06 (p = .12) 
.06 
234.84 
.97 
.96 
.06 (p = .18) 
.07 
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Table 4.  
Differences between Mountaineers, Skydivers, and Low-risk controls for Sensation Seeking, Emotion Regulation, and Agency before, while, and 
after participating in Study 2.  
 Mountaineers 
(n = 28) 
Skydivers 
(n = 35) 
Low-risk control 
(n = 28) 
Omnibus between-groups 
difference 
     Before participating      
Need for Sensation  4.87 (1.43) 5.72 (1.01)a 4.59 (1.26) F(2, 88) = 7.37, p < .001 
Difficulty with Emotion Regulation 2.74 (1.05) 2.55 (1.06) 2.21 (0.97) F(2, 88) = 1.88, p = .16  
Diminished Agency 2.30 (1.21) 2.32 (1.15) 1.98 (0.90) F(2, 88) = 0.85, p = .43 
     
     While participating     
Experience of Sensation  5.40 (1.15) 6.06 (0.77)a 4.88 (1.14) F(2, 88) = 10.67, p < .001 
Experience of Emotion Regulation 4.99 (1.16)b 5.13 (1.05)b 3.24 (0.87) F(2, 87) = 20.56, p < .001 
Experience of Agency 5.29 (1.09)b 5.71 (0.77)b 4.53 (0.98) F(2, 87) = 3.39, p < .05 
     
     After participating     
Satisfaction of Sensation Need 5.06 (1.12) 5.90 (1.08)a 4.63 (1.33) F(2, 88) = 9.70, p < .001 
Agentic Emotion Regulation 4.57 (1.34)a 4.19 (1.34) 3.42 (1.29) F(2, 87) = 5.06, p < .01 
Note: a = significantly greater than the other two groups; b = significantly greater than the control group. 
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Table 5.  
Correlations between the Between Participations SEAS subscales and other established personality constructs in Study 3 (n =112).  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. SEAS Sensation seeking .85             
2. SEAS Emotion Regulation .14 .82            
3. SEAS Agency .13 .77*** .85           
4. Sensation seeking .25** .13 .02 .79          
5. Emotion regulation -.05 -.44*** -.26** .03 .83         
6. Lack of Mastery  .05 .53*** .58*** -.14 -.50*** .82        
7. Extraversion .21* -.09 -.10 .23* .05 -.18 .58       
8. Conscientiousness -.10 -.21* -.22* -.02 .34*** -.27** .04 .41      
9. Openness .12 -.04 -.15 .22* .08 -.22* .37*** .12 .37     
10. Emotional stability -.08 -.44*** -.24* .05 .74*** -.45*** .00 .23* .07 .59    
11. Agreeableness .02 -.11 -.04 -.05 .11 -.01 -.04 -.07 -.09 .28** .31   
12. Impression management 
13. Self-deception enhancement 
-.26** 
-.04 
.02 
-.33** 
.14 
-.29** 
-.38** 
.04 
.21* 
.58** 
.13 
-.49** 
-.31** 
.15 
.17 
.38** 
-.12 
.21* 
.04 
.49** 
-.03 
.01 
.76 
.02 
 
.68 
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. SEAS Sensation seeking = Need for sensation; SEAS Emotion Regulation = Difficulty with Emotion Regulation; SEAS 
Agency = Diminished Agency; Sensation seeking = total score on Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale; Emotion Regulation = the ability to regulate one’s own 
emotions from Tett et al.’s (2005) Emotional Intelligence Scale; Agency = General perceived lack of mastery from Pearlin and Schooler’s (1978) inventory; 
Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness to new experience, Emotional stability, and Agreeableness from Gosling et al.’s (2003) Ten-Item Personality Inventory; 
Impression management and self-deception enhancement from Paulhus’ (1994) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. Coefficient alphas are on the diagonal.  
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Table 6.  
Differences between Mountaineers, Skydivers, and Low-risk controls for the Sensation Seeking, Emotion Regulation, and Agency between 
participations and previously established measures of Sensation Seeking, Emotion Regulation, Agency, Personality, and Social Desirability in 
Study 3.  
 Mountaineers 
(n = 39) 
Skydivers 
(n = 41) 
Low-risk control 
(n = 32) 
Omnibus between-groups 
difference 
     SEAS Between participations      
Need for Sensation  5.27 (1.15) 6.10 (0.84)c 5.69 (0.85) F(2, 109) = 7.39, p < .001 
Difficulty with Emotion Regulation 3.12 (1.25) 2.82 (1.24) 2.95 (1.29) F(2, 109) = 0.58, p > .50 
Diminished Agency 3.02 (1.38) 2.59 (1.31) 2.79 (1.42) F(2, 109) = 0.98, p = .38 
     Sensation Seeking 25.67 (5.09)b 26.15 (4.91)b 21.78 (6.06) F(2, 109) = 6.97, p < .01 
     Lack of Mastery 1.78 (0.67) 1.62 (0.61) 1.91 (0.59) F(2, 109) = 1.87, p = .16 
     Ability to Regulate One’s Emotions 4.54 (0.56)b 4.51 (0.77)b 3.91 (0.82) F(2, 109) = 8.46, p < .001 
     Social Desirability     
Impression management 3.72 (.80) 3.48 (.78) 3.71 (.70) F(2, 109) = 1.29, p = .28 
Self-deception enhancement 4.41 (.57) 4.56 (.54)b 4.15 (.62) F(2, 109) = 4.70, p < .05 
     Personality 
Extraversion 
Emotional Stability 
Openness  
Conscientiousness 
Agreeableness 
 
4.42 (1.11) 
5.79 (0.77)b 
5.67 (1.16) 
5.64 (1.04)b 
4.82 (1.11) 
 
4.37 (1.62) 
5.80 (1.20)b 
5.76 (1.02) 
5.28 (1.14) 
4.82 (1.24) 
 
4.67 (1.31) 
5.05 (1.07) 
5.69 (0.98) 
4.91 (1.13) 
4.73 (1.03) 
 
F(2, 109) = 0.49, p > .50 
F(2, 109) = 6.12, p < .05 
F(2, 109) = 0.08, p > .50 
F(2, 109) = 3.91, p < .05 
F(2, 109) = 0.06, p > .50 
Note: a = significantly greater than the other two groups; b = significantly greater than the control group; c = significantly greater than mountaineers. Sensation seeking = total 
score on Zuckerman’s (1979) Sensation Seeking Scale; Emotion Regulation = the ability to regulate one’s own emotions from Tett et al.’s (2005) Emotional Intelligence 
Scale; Agency = General perceived lack of mastery from Pearlin and Schooler’s (1978) inventory; Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness to new experience, Emotional 
stability, and Agreeableness from Gosling et al.’s (2003) Ten-Item Personality Inventory; Impression management and self-deception enhancement from Paulhus’ (1994) 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding.  
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Table 7.  
Multiple logistic regression analysis for predicting high-risk activity as a function of Zuckerman’s (1979) SSS-V subscales and the SEAS Need 
for Sensation. 
 
     95% confidence interval for Odds Ratio 
 B  (SE) Wald Chi-square Odds Ratio Lower Upper 
SSS-V       
     Thrill and Adventure Seeking 0.27  (.20) 1.85 1.31 .89 1.93 
     Disinhibition 0.03  (.14) 0.04 1.03 .78 1.35 
     Boredom susceptibility -0.07  (.13) 0.29 .93 .72 1.20 
     Experience Seeking -0.36  (.19) 3.73 .70 .48 1.01 
SEAS       
     Need for Sensation 0.98  (.32) 9.46* 2.68 1.43 5.01 
Constant -5.36 (2.16) 6.18* .01 - - 
* p < .05 
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Table 8.  
Differences between Mountaineers, Skydivers, and Low-risk controls for the Sensation Seeking, Emotion Regulation, and Agency in SEAS 
Between, While, and After participating in Study 4.  
 Mountaineers 
(n = 46) 
Skydivers 
(n = 100) 
Low-risk control 
(n = 47) 
Omnibus between-groups 
difference 
     Between participations      
Need for Sensation  5.07 (1.25) 5.64 (1.30)a 5.05 (1.26) F(2, 190) = 5.01, p < .01 
     
     Multivariate Emotion Regulation analysis     
Difficulty with Emotion Regulation 3.61 (1.45)d 3.06 (1.37) 3.43 (1.58) F(4, 378) = 2.69, p < .05; 
Wilks’ Λ = .95 Emotion Regulation Expectancy 3.84 (1.73)d 2.90 (1.58) 3.28 (1.74) 
     
     Multivariate Agency analysis     
Diminished Agency 3.12 (1.32)d 2.81 (1.29) 2.79 (1.46) F(4, 378) = 2.67, p < .05; 
Wilks’ Λ = .95 Agency Expectancy  3.89 (1.81)d 2.96 (1.58) 2.94 (1.70) 
     
     While participating     
Experience of Sensation  5.18 (0.88) 5.80 (0.87)a 5.23 (0.92) F(2, 190) = 10.82, p < .001 
Experience of Emotion Regulation 5.71 (0.79)a 5.00 (0.97)b 4.22 (1.11) F(2, 189) = 34.80, p < .001 
Experience of Agency 5.46 (0.74)b 5.64 (0.73)b 4.81 (0.96) F(2, 189) = 13.21, p < .001 
     
     After participating     
Satisfaction of Sensation Need 4.71 (1.22) 5.48 (1.02)a 4.99 (1.09) F(2, 190) = 8.86, p < .001 
Agentic Emotion Regulation 4.92 (1.25)a 4.59 (1.10) 4.29 (1.40) F(2, 189) = 6.58, p < .005 
Note: a = significantly greater than the other two groups; b = significantly greater than the control group. d = multivariate discriminant from the other two 
groups following examination of the discriminant function at group centroids.  
